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Abstract
Milk is a perishable commodity. Adulteration and poor hygiene compromises quality and food
safety. Understanding the implications of market structure and actors’ behaviour in marketing
such delicate commodity is essential. Differences in exchange arrangements and actors’ abilities,
initial resource positions, information endowments, and risk preferences could determine market
outcomes. New institutional economics of markets stresses the importance of studying structure
of specific transaction arrangements and provides frameworks for examining the implications of
various constraints in determining market conduct/behaviour and performance. In this study, we
examined raw milk marketing in Sululta, Lume and Ade’a districts of central Ethiopia using the
new institutional economics of markets framework. Data were obtained through household survey,
focus group discussions, and interviews with key informants and experts. Raw milk is the cheapest
in Sululta compared to the other districts. Milk collection in Sululta is largely a monopsonistic
competition among a few small private traders who lack advanced quality testing tools. Private
collectors’ inability to precisely detect adulteration creates bounded rationality. This encourages
farmers to prefer private collectors to other rather strict buyers. Processors and cooperatives who
dominate the market in Lume and Ade’a conduct more rigorous quality tests. The cooperatives in
particular create hybrid governance where many suppliers are shareholders or members of primary
cooperatives with responsibility to maintain quality. Consumers are also unable to identify adulte-
ration when they get mixed milk from collectors which cannot be traced to a particular source. The
bounded rationality encourages opportunism where some farmers add water and other substances
to milk especially in private collections. High degree of bounded rationality and opportunism in
unregulated markets drives out genuine farmers. This threatens the prospect of improving milk
productivity and sectoral sustainability. Besides, the adulteration and deteriorating milk quality
increases public health risk. Trust and personal relationships reduces adulteration when buyers get
milk directly from local farmers although prices are rather high in such arrangement. Therefore, co-
operative marketing, stricter regulations, better quality testing and direct marketing are important.
This study showcases how organised marketing such as cooperatives and localised direct marketing
could outperform unregulated competition in marketing delicate commodities.
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